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An Empirical Analysis of the Use of the Intent Test to Determine Parentage
in Assisted Reproductive Technology Cases
Abstract
States have been slow to adopt model acts regarding assisted reproductive technology (ART), or to draft ART
legislation of their own, leaving most parents of ART children without a clear path to obtain legal parentage.
As a result, when a child conceived via ART is born, the adults involved must turn to the courts to make a
determination as to legal parentage. These courts have used a variety of approaches to determine legal
parentage in ART cases, which along with the inherent discretion involved in judicial decisions absent clear
precedent or statute has led to unpredictable, and sometimes inequitable, findings regarding parentage of ART
children. This Article seeks to uncover what bases courts have used to determine parentage of ART children
and whether courts have, perhaps unwittingly, developed a consensus as to how to best determine parentage
of children conceived via ART.
This Article provides the results of a first-of-its-kind study of every case on Westlaw addressing parentage of
ART children. Each case was coded and analyzed based on what test the court used to determine legal
parentage of an ART child and what factors of each case were statistically significant in making that
determination. The empirical evidence demonstrates two facts: (1) courts have used five different tests to
determine parentage of ART children; and (2) regardless of the test used by the court, in over 74% of the
cases, the outcome of the case was the same as if the intent test had been used.
Part II of this Article describes the methodology of the study, including how the relevant cases were identified
and how those cases were coded and analyzed. Part III identifies the various tests courts have used to
determine parentage in ART cases. This Part also describes each test and provides examples of how courts
have applied each test. Finally, Part IV presents the data, noting which aspects of the cases were statistically
relevant to the courts' determinations and demonstrating courts' tendencies to vest legal parentage in the
intended parents, even if the court does not apply the intent test by name.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-four years ago, Professor Marjorie Shultz 
introduced the intent test as a means to determine parentage 
of children conceived via assisted reproductive technology 
(ART).1 According to Professor Shultz, when a child is 
conceived via ART, the person(s) that intended to bring the 
child into the world and raise the child should be the childs 
legal parent(s).2 Only three years after the publication of 
Professor Shultzs article, the California Supreme Court 
applied this intent test in Johnson v. Calvert.3 In Johnson, 
both the surrogate that gestated the child and the woman that 
provided the egg used to conceive the child claimed to be the 
childs legal mother.4 The court held that the genetic mother 
was the legal mother because she was the woman who, when 
the child was conceived, intended to raise the child.5 Since 
then, every model act that has been drafted in the United 
States to address issues that arise when children are conceived 
via ART has incorporated the intent test to determine legal 
parentage.6 
Unfortunately, states have been slow to adopt these model 
acts, or to draft ART legislation of their own, leaving most 
parents of ART children without a clear path to obtain legal 
parentage.7 As a result, when a child conceived via ART is 
                                            
 1. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based 
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 32225. 
 2. Id. at 323 (Within the context of artificial reproductive techniques, intentions 
that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to 
determine legal parenthood.). 
 3. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993). 
 4. Id. at 778. 
 5. Id. at 782 ([A]lthough the [Uniform Parentage] Act recognizes both genetic 
consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, 
when the two means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the 
childthat is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to 
raise as her ownis the natural mother under California law.). 
 6. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 703, 801, 807 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71, 
7778, 84 (Supp. 2012) (determining parentage based on intent when a child is conceived 
via alternative insemination or when gestational surrogacy is used); MODEL ACT 
GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. §§ 602−03 (2008), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf (providing model 
legislative provisions that determine parentage based on intent when a child is conceived 
via assisted reproduction); see also Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
47/15 (LexisNexis 2010) (determining parentage based on intent when gestational 
surrogacy is used). 
 7. See Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 388 (2012) (noting that 
while some states have adopted some form of ART legislation, approximately thirty 
states either have no statute or have statutes diverging significantly from the model 
statutes). When a child is conceived via sexual reproduction, the determination of legal 
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born, the adults involved must turn to the courts to make a 
determination as to legal parentage. These courts have used a 
variety of approaches to determine legal parentage in ART 
cases, whichalong with the inherent discretion involved in 
judicial decisions absent clear precedent or statutehas led to 
unpredictable, and sometimes inequitable, findings regarding 
parentage of ART children. This Article seeks to uncover what 
bases courts have used to determine parentage of ART 
children and whether courts have, perhaps unwittingly, 
developed a consensus as to how to best determine parentage 
of children conceived via ART. 
This Article provides the results of a first-of-its-kind study 
of every case on Westlaw addressing parentage of ART 
children. Each case was coded and analyzed based on what 
test the court used to determine legal parentage of an ART 
child and what factors of each case were statistically 
significant in making that determination. The empirical 
evidence demonstrates two facts: (1) courts have used five 
different tests to determine parentage of ART children;8 and 
(2) regardless of the test used by the court, in over 74% of the 
cases, the outcome of the case was the same as if the intent 
test had been used.9 
Part II of this Article describes the methodology of the 
study, including how the relevant cases were identified and 
how those cases were coded and analyzed. Part III identifies 
the various tests courts have used to determine parentage in 
ART cases. This Part also describes each test and provides 
examples of how courts have applied each test. Finally, Part IV 
presents the data, noting which aspects of the cases were 
statistically relevant to the courts determinations and 
                                            
parentage is relatively clear under state statutes. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni 
Vainik Ives, Which Came First the Parent or the Child?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 
332−34 (2010) (The current parentage system is founded on the assumption that the 
genetic mother and father should be the legal parents of children conceived through 
sexual reproduction.). In every state, the genetic mother, as evidenced by giving 
birth to the child, is the legal mother. Id. at 33233; see also James G. Dwyer, A 
Taxonomy of Childrens Existing Rights in State Decision Making About Their 
Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 859 & n.28 (2003) (supplying a 
comprehensive list of state statutes that define the legal mother as the woman who 
gave birth to the child). State statutes also seek to quickly identify the genetic father 
as the legal father via a series of presumptions. See Byrn & Ives, supra, at 33334. 
With the use of ART, determining parentage is more complex because up to five 
individuals can be directly involved in the creation and conception of a child: (1) the 
sperm provider; (2) the egg provider; (3) the gestating mother; (4) the intended 
mother; and (5) the intended coparent. Id. at 340 & n.174. 
 8. See infra Table 1. 
 9. See infra Table 7b and accompanying text. 
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demonstrating courts tendencies to vest legal parentage in the 
intended parents, even if the court does not apply the intent 
test by name. 
II. METHODOLOGYFIFTY-STATE CASE SURVEY 
The purpose of this study was twofold. First, the study 
sought to determine on what bases courts have decided ART 
parentage cases. Second, the study considered whether the 
results in ART parentage cases tended to favor the intended 
parent(s). In addition, the study identified which factual 
aspects of a case, if any, were statistically significant relative 
to the determination of parentage. This Part describes the 
methodology used throughout the study, including how the 
data set was developed, how the cases were coded, and how the 
data was analyzed. 
A. The Data Set 
The first step in this study was developing the Westlaw 
search strategy to collect and compile the relevant cases. A 
comprehensive search term was developed to be inclusive of all 
methods of ART.10 This search term was entered into the 
Westlaw search engine for all cases.11 The results of this search 
formed the initial case record. The initial case record was 
enlarged by performing a review of the cases citing and cited 
by each case in the initial search. Additional relevant cases 
were added to the record. To further develop the record, and in 
an attempt to ensure that as many relevant cases as possible 
were reviewed and included, a search of relevant Westlaw Key 
Numbers was also performed.12 
The cases in this record were then reviewed for relevance 
to the study. Cases that determined a procedural issue that 
was unrelated to a determination of parentage were removed 
from the case record. For example, a case that determined 
standing of an intended parent was included, whereas a case 
                                            
 10. The comprehensive search term was as follows: (ASSIST! REPRODUCT! IVF IN 
VITRO FERTILIZATION EGG DON! SPERM DON! SURROGACY) & (PARENTAGE 
PARENTAL STATUS LEGAL PARENT NATURAL PARENT PARENT CHILD 
RELATIONSHIP) & (DETERMINE ESTABLISH) /P (INTENT! GENETIC! BEST 
INTEREST CHILD). 
 11. One limitation on the number of cases included is simply that not all cases are 
reported in Westlaw. 
 12. These included 289k20: Partnership, Creation of Relation in General; 76Hk15: 
Children Out-of-Wedlock, Assisted Reproduction, Surrogate Parenting; and 76Dk274.5: Child 
Custody, Assisted Reproduction, Surrogate Parenting. 
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that was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction was not.13 The final 
case record consisted of 208 cases.14 All 208 cases were then 
coded according to the factors set forth below. 
B. Coded Factors 
In order to gain an understanding of the relationship 
among certain factors in each case and the overarching 
relationships and trends between the cases, the cases were 
coded for important factors based on an empirical studies 
approach known as content analysis.15 Each case was coded 
for several factors, including the following16: 
• State; 
• Year decided; 
• Method of ART used; 
• Intended parents marital status; 
• Intended parents sexual orientation; 
• Approach used by the court to determine 
parentage; and 
• Whether the judicial decision result was the same 
as the intent test.17 
                                            
 13. To determine if a case is relevant for this study, the case was reviewed to 
ensure that the issue in the case was parentage of a child conceived by ART. Cases 
that did not fit this description were not included, nor were cases that primarily 
resolved issues related to the disposition or use of cryopreserved genetic tissue. 
 14. The record was further limited only to the case opinion decided by the 
highest court at the time of collection, October 22, 2012. 
 15. Content analysis is a method of empirical study in which the researcher 
collects a set of cases, systematically reviews them to record the material factors in 
each opinion, and further reviews the collection for statistical meaning among such 
factors. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of 
Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 64 (2008). 
 16. Additional coded factors were (1) whether or not the parties in the 
proceeding were adversarial; (2) which parties were asserting parentage; 
(3) surrogates marital status (if applicable); (4) intended parents genetic and/or 
gestational contribution to the ART process; (5) instrument used to demonstrate the 
parties intentions; (6) initial action and main issue(s) to be decided by the court (the 
issue is always relevant to the determination of parentage, but at times is phrased 
differently; for example, in some cases the main issue to be decided was child 
support, however, a determination of parentage was necessary first); (7) procedural 
posture and holding; (8) statutes used, if any; (9) precedent used, if any; (10) action 
by the court; (11) the name and gender of the judge; (12) dissenting opinion, if any; 
(13) concurring opinion, if any; (14) if published; (15) Westlaw KeyCite designation; 
and (16) Westlaw Key Number related to ART. 
 17. Intent for purposes of this study was measured by the intent of the parties 
prior to or contemporaneous with conception, generally recorded in some kind of 
instrument or other evidence communicated at trial, for example, testimony 
regarding conduct of the parties involved. 
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These factors can be divided into two general categories: 
(1) factual datathose coded factors that consist of factual 
information provided by the court in its opinion such as the 
year decidedand (2) substantive datathose coded factors 
that required interpretation. The substantive data consists of 
what approach the court used to determine parentage and 
whether the result would have been the same had the intent 
test been used. To ensure the record for the substantive data 
was as accurate and replicable as possible, one person did all 
of the coding. Any questions regarding coding were discussed 
and resolved in regular meetings with the principal Author. 
Particularly important was the coding for cases in which the 
judge considered multiple tests to determine parentage. In 
these cases, the substantive data was coded in favor of the test 
the court considered to be the most determinative.18 Finally, all 
of the coding discussed in this Article was checked by the 
principal Author. 
C. Statistical Analysis 
The coded cases were then analyzed to determine the 
factors that were significant in terms of the determination of 
parentage. In Part IV, tables are provided that show the 
significance of the type of ART used,19 the relationship status 
of the parties using ART,20 and the jurisdictional location of the 
court.21 In order to establish statistical significance, Chi-
squared tests were conducted. A Chi-squared test is used to 
determine if there is a significant relationship between groups 
of categorical variables.22 In each Chi-squared test, we 
assumed a null hypothesis of independence between the 
variables in question. If a Chi-squared probability was less 
than or equal to 0.05, the null hypothesis was rejected. In 
other words, if the Chi-squared probability was less than or 
equal to 0.05, it was concluded that a statistically significant 
relationship existed between the row variable and column 
variable. That is, the relationship between the variables was 
not random. If the Chi-squared probability was greater than 
0.05, it was concluded that there was no significant 
                                            
 18. This process of regular questioning and independent double-checking of the 
record was performed to ensure that the coding was consistent and replicable so that 
ultimately the results of this study are reliable. 
 19.   See infra Table 4. 
 20. See infra Table 5. 
 21. See infra Table 6. 
 22. JOSEPH F. HEALEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF STATISTICS 264 (2d ed. 2010). 
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relationship between the row variable and the column 
variable. 
III. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DETERMINING PARENTAGE IN 
ART CASES 
In the 208 cases included in this study, judges used five 
different tests to determine legal parentage of children 
conceived via ART: (1) applying a state statute; (2) relying on 
public policy; (3) determining what was in the best interests of 
the child; (4) awarding parentage to the genetic parents; and 
(5) awarding parentage to the adults that, at the time of 
conception, intended to raise the child. Each of these 
approaches is described below. 
A. Determining Parentage by Applying a State Statute 
The statutory approach bases a parentage determination 
on legislation adopted in the state in which the case is 
adjudicated. Many states, for example, have adopted ART 
statutes to deal with parentage in the context of a 
heterosexual, married couple who conceives a child via 
alternative insemination.23 A majority of states, however, do 
not have statutes explicitly addressing parentage 
determinations involving a large portion of ART cases that 
come before the courts today such as cases involving in vitro 
fertilization (IVF), surrogacy, known gamete donors, or same-
sex couples.24 In these cases, some judges have found ways to 
determine legal parentage of children conceived via various 
                                            
 23. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2007) (stating that upon consent, the 
husband is treated as the legal father of a child conceived by his wife through alternative 
insemination); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2011) (describing the relationship of a child 
conceived from alternative insemination to the mothers husband). 
 24. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 899, 899900, 918, 92829 (2012); Marjorie M. Shultz, Taking Account of ARTs 
in Determining Parenthood: A Troubling Dispute in California, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 
77, 79, 8687, 100 & nn.77−78 (2005) (noting that many states have adopted the 1973 
Uniform Parentage Act, which does not address ART, and only a few states have adopted 
new statutes, including the 2002 Uniform Parentage Act, that specifically address ART 
issues); see also Linda S. Anderson, Adding Players to the Game: Parentage 
Determinations When Assisted Reproductive Technology Is Used to Create Families, 62 
ARK. L. REV. 29, 3337 (2009) (discussing the legislative silence as to parentage 
determinations of children born via ART, other than the marital paternity presumption 
when alternative insemination is used); Darra L. Hofman, Mamas Baby, Daddys 
Maybe: A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 
35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 454−60 (2009) (discussing the lack of statutory authority 
for parentage determinations in ART disputes, particularly where surrogacy is used, and 
presenting a table of the status of surrogacy agreements in the states and the District of 
Columbia). 
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ART methods by applying statutes not originally intended for 
that purpose. Courts have applied statutes in ART cases in 
three different circumstances: (1) the court simply applies an 
ART statute that is directly on point; (2) the court applies an 
ART statute to a factual situation not contemplated by the 
statute; or (3) the court applies a non-ART statute to an ART 
situation. 
The first variation of the statutory approach is 
straightforward, with the court merely applying a statute 
according to its terms.25 The most common ART statute deals 
with alternative insemination.26 Most of these statutes 
automatically vest the husband with legal parentage when his 
wife conceives a child using alternative insemination, even if 
the husbands sperm was not used.27 A few states also have 
clear legislation governing parentage determinations in ART 
cases beyond alternative insemination.28 Illinois, for example, 
has enacted a Gestational Surrogacy Act, which outlines the 
requirements for establishing legal parentage in the intended 
parents when a child is gestated by a surrogate.29 Although 
under these more progressive ART statutes the persons vested 
with legal parentage are the intended parents, for the 
                                            
 25. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753, at *1, *19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Jan. 18, 1991) (holding that a husband was not obligated to pay child support unless he 
had consented, in writing, to the artificial insemination as was required under New York 
domestic relations law). 
 26. See Byrn & Ives, supra note 7, at 340 n.177 (stating that two-thirds of the states 
have alternative insemination statutes); Shultz, supra note 1, at 309 n.33, 372 (noting 
that alternative insemination has existed for decades and many states have statutes 
governing it). 
 27. Byrn & Ives, supra note 7, at 319; Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure 
Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS 
L.J. 597, 623 (2002); see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2007) (If, under the 
supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is 
inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is 
treated in law as if he were the biological father of a child thereby conceived.). 
 28. E.g., Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15 (LexisNexis 
2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (LexisNexis 2010) (naming the intended parents as 
the legal parents of a child born via a gestational surrogate so long as they are married 
and both are also the genetic parents of the child); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-08 (2009) 
(declaring that the intended parents are the legal parents of a child born to a gestational 
surrogate, and negating any potential parental status in the surrogate or her husband, if 
any); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756 (West 2008) (establishing legal parentage in the 
intended parents when a gestational surrogacy agreement is validated by the court prior 
to the start of the ART procedure). 
 29. Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15 (LexisNexis 2010). 
A gestational surrogate is a woman not genetically related to the child who carries out 
the gestational function and gives birth to a child for another . . . and who relinquishes 
any parental rights she may have upon the birth of the child. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 
1106 (9th ed. 2009); see also Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the Law: 
Disharmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 465, 477 (2006). 
Do Not Delete  4/28/2013  10:03 AM 
2013] INTENT TEST IN ART CASES 1303 
purposes of this study, if a court applied a state statute, the 
case was coded as determining parentage by applying a state 
statute. 
The second variation of the statutory approach occurs 
when a court applies an ART statute to a factual situation that 
does not explicitly fit the text of the statute or the explicit 
intent of the drafters of the statute. Although some states have 
an alternative insemination statute, the language of these 
statutes suggests that they apply in very limited 
circumstances.30 A typical alternative insemination statute 
provides that the husband is the legal father when he consents 
in writing to the insemination of his wife, by a licensed 
physician, using donated sperm.31 Despite the limiting 
language of these statutes, courts have applied them beyond 
situations that meet all of the factual requirements. These 
statutes have been used to determine parentage of children 
conceived via alternative insemination to single persons,32 
same-sex couples,33 and parties that otherwise did not strictly 
comply with the statutory requirements.34 For example, the 
Oregon Court of Appeals used this variation of the statutory 
approach when it expanded the application of its alternative 
insemination statute.35 Although the language of its 
alternative insemination statute is limited to a husband and 
wife,36 the court extended the statute to include the same-sex 
                                            
 30. Byrn & Ives, supra note 7, at 340. 
 31. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2011); 
see also Storrow, supra note 27, at 62324 (stating that [u]nder all statutes that define 
the paternity ramifications of artificial insemination by donor, the husband of an 
artificially inseminated woman is the father of the resulting child if he consented to the 
insemination, and noting that [t]he typical method of demonstrating consent is through 
a signed writing). 
 32. E.g., In re Adoption of Michael, 636 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (Sur. Ct. 1996) (holding 
that New Yorks alternative insemination statute, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 
2010), which works to bar sperm donors from asserting any parental rights, applied to a 
single woman, despite the statutory language referring only to married women). 
 33. E.g., In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036, 103738, 1042 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 2005) (applying New Jerseys alternative insemination statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:17-44 (West 2002), to a same-sex female couple, declaring both intended mothers as 
legal parents, though only one woman was biologically related to the child conceived 
through alternative insemination, they were not married, and the statutory language 
referred only to a wife and her husband). 
 34. E.g., Lane v. Lane, 912 P.2d 290, 29596 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (finding the 
intended father who did not consent in writing to the alternative insemination of his wife 
as required by New Mexicos alternative insemination statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 
(2006) (repealed 2009), was nevertheless the legal father). 
 35. Shineovich v. Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 3940 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). 
 36. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2011). 
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domestic partner of a woman who gave birth to a child 
conceived via alternative insemination.37 
In the third variation of the statutory approach, courts 
apply non-ART statutes, such as second-parent adoption 
statutes or paternity presumptions, beyond their explicit 
legislative terms to determine parentage in an ART case.38 In 
Elisa B. v. Superior Court, for example, the Supreme Court of 
California used this statutory approach when it applied a 
legislative paternity presumption in a gender-neutral 
manner.39 In that case, Elisa disputed her obligation to support 
twins born to her former same-sex partner on the basis that 
she was not genetically related to the twins or otherwise 
determined to be the twins legal mother.40 Applying a 
paternity presumption included in the California Uniform 
Parentage Act,41 the court held that Elisa was a legal parent 
because she actively participated in causing the conception of 
the children with the understanding that she would raise them 
jointly with the birth mother, and she received the children 
into her home and openly held them out as her own.42 
Of the cases analyzed in this survey, 51.92% used the 
statutory approach as the basis for the judicial decision.43 Over 
63% of these cases would have had the same parentage 
outcome had the intent test been used.44 
B. Determining Parentage Based on Public Policy 
In states where no ART statutes exist and courts choose 
not to apply statutes in unintended ways, some courts have 
turned to public policy to determine parentage of ART 
children.45 The public policy approach is different than the 
                                            
 37. Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 32, 39−40 (finding that the women otherwise complied 
with the statutory requirements of consent and that the parties intended to coparent the 
child). 
 38. E.g., Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 127276 (Vt. 1993) (applying 
Vermonts second-parent adoption statute to a same-sex couple, allowing for a joint 
adoption without terminating the parental rights of the biological intended mother). 
 39. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 66470 (Cal. 2005). 
 40. Id. at 66364. 
 41. California Uniform Parentage Act, CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West Supp. 2013) 
(presuming parentage when an individual receives the child into his home and openly 
holds out the child as his natural child). 
 42. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670. 
 43. See infra Table 1. 
 44. See infra Table 7b (excluding traditional surrogacy). 
 45. See T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 124951 (Mass. 2004); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 
1227, 1234, 124647 (N.J. 1988) (We invalidate the surrogacy contract because it 
conflicts with the law and public policy of this State.). 
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statutory approach in that it is based on a general application 
of statutory principles. The statutory approach identifies a 
specific statute and applies its elements directly or by analogy 
to the case at hand, whereas the public policy approach 
identifies more general legislative principles and uses these 
principles to determine parentage.46 
The public policy approach was used in In re Baby M to 
invalidate a traditional surrogacy agreement and establish 
that the surrogate, not the intended mother, was the legal 
mother of the child.47 There was not a statute directly on point 
in the state of New Jersey and, rather than applying a non-
ART statute, the court concluded that the surrogacy contract 
is based on[ ] principles that are directly contrary to the 
objectives of our laws.48 The court reasoned that the public 
policies underlying various state parentage statutes, including 
policies against the separation of a child from its genetic 
mother, prohibiting the payment of money in connection with 
adoption, and preventing a child from being raised by both of 
its natural parents prevented the court from enforcing the 
surrogacy contract.49 
The public policy approach was also used in Debra H. v. 
Janice R., a case in which the court found that two women who 
entered a civil union in Vermont were both parents of the child 
born during the civil union.50 The couple separated when the 
child was two years old, and the nonbiological mother sought 
custody and visitation rights.51 The New York court found that, 
as a matter of public policy, New York courts should recognize 
parentage created by a Vermont civil union and declared both 
women to be legal parents of the child.52 
Of the cases surveyed, 8.17% used public policy as the 
basis of the judicial decision.53 Over 64% of these cases would 
                                            
 46. Compare In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240, 124647 (employing the public policy 
approach by applying New Jerseys policies expressed in [its] comprehensive laws to 
evaluate a surrogacy agreement), with In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 87879 (S.C. 1987) 
(applying an ART statute to determine parentage in an alternative insemination case). 
 47. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234. A traditional surrogacy contract is one in 
which the surrogate agrees to be inseminated with . . . sperm, and to carry the pregnancy 
to term. Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the 
Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating Non-Traditional Gestational 
Surrogacy Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 675 (2000). 
 48. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240, 124647, 1250. 
 49. Id. at 124650. 
 50. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 196 (N.Y. 2010).  
 51. Id. at 186.  
 52. Id. at 19697.  
 53. See infra Table 1. 
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have had the same parentage outcome had the intent test been 
used.54 
C. Determining Parentage Based on the Best Interests of the 
Child 
When determining legal parentage, the best interests of 
the child (BIOC) approach relies on a case-by-case factual 
inquiry into what is in the best interests of the child based on 
certain factors. Though these factors are often codified in a 
statute, the BIOC approach has been categorically 
differentiated from the statutory approach for purposes of this 
study due to its particular focus on a postbirth factual 
investigation. 
In Rubano v. DiCenzo, the BIOC approach was used to 
resolve a case in which a woman petitioned for a declaration of 
parentage with respect to the biological child of her former 
same-sex domestic partner.55 The petitioner was deemed by the 
court to be a de facto parent entitled to certain legal parental 
rights, including visitation, because it was in the best interests 
of the child.56 The court summarized its BIOC inquiry stating 
that the biological mother could not arbitrarily terminate the 
de facto parental relationship the intended mother had with 
the child, a relationship that the biological mother intended to 
create and fostered for many years.57 
Of the cases surveyed, 15.87% used the BIOC approach as 
the basis of the judicial decision.58 Over 76% of these cases 
would have had the same parentage outcome had the intent 
test been used.59 
D. Determining Parentage Based on Genetics 
The genetic test determines legal parentage based on a 
genetic relationship with the child.60 The court in Belsito v. 
Clark articulated the genetic test when it analyzed the relative 
parental rights of two intended parents who were also the 
genetic parents, against the interests of a gestational 
                                            
 54. See infra Table 7b (excluding traditional surrogacy). 
 55. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 96163, 976−77 (R.I. 2000). Although 
Rubano never adopted the child, for four years she lived together with DiCenzo and both 
of them raised the boy as their son. Id. at 961. 
 56. Id. at 975−76. 
 57. Id. at 976. 
 58. See infra Table 1. 
 59. See infra Table 7b (excluding traditional surrogacy). 
 60. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994). 
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surrogate.61 According to the court, [i]f the genetic providers 
have not waived their rights and have decided to raise the 
child, then they must be recognized as the natural and legal 
parents.62 Under this analysis, the act of giving birth, by a 
gestational surrogate for example, is subordinate and 
secondary to genetics.63 In Belsito, therefore, the two genetic 
providers were declared the childs legal parents.64 
Of the cases surveyed, only 3.37% used genetics as the 
basis of the judicial decision.65 Over 83% of these cases would 
have had the same parentage outcome had the intent test been 
used.66 
E. Determining Parentage Based on Intent 
The intent test vests legal parentage in the party or 
parties that affirmatively intended to conceive and raise a 
child, and [b]ut for their acted-on intention, the child would 
not exist.67 The persons who intended to conceive and raise 
the child are held responsible for the care and support of that 
child, even if they later attempt to avoid such responsibility,68 
thereby avoiding a situation in which a child could be found to 
have no legal parents69 or an unwitting donor or surrogate 
could be found legally responsible for the child. 
In Johnson v. Calvert, the landmark case that articulated 
the intent test, the court determined legal maternity as 
between the intended mother and the gestational carrier.70 
Both women wanted to be declared the legal mother.71 Both 
women also had a legally recognized maternal relationship 
                                            
 61. Id. at 761−64. 
 62. Id. at 767. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  
 65. See infra Table 1. 
 66. See infra Table 7b (excluding traditional surrogacy). 
 67. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993). 
 68. See Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 60405 (Ind. 2004) (determining that a man 
who consented to insemination of his former wife during their marriage was the legal 
father of the child that resulted from insemination and, therefore, was responsible for 
paying child support). 
 69. See, e.g., Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
280, 282, 293−94 (Ct. App. 1998) (reversing the lower courts declaration that the child 
born to a gestational surrogate, and conceived using anonymously donated sperm and 
ova, had no legal parents; finding instead that the intended parents are the legal 
parents). 
 70. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778, 782; see also PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: 
THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN AND CUSTODY 341 (2d ed., rev. & updated 2011). 
 71. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. 
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with the childthe intended mother as the genetic mother and 
the gestational carrier as the birth mother.72 To break this 
maternity tie, the court looked to the parties intent at the 
outset of the arrangement.73 The court ultimately declared that 
the intended mother was the legal mother, saying [the 
woman] who intended to procreate the childthat is, she who 
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended 
to raise as her ownis the natural mother.74 Since Johnson 
was decided in 1993, courts have continued to use and broaden 
the scope of the intent test. For instance, in 1994, a New York 
court applied the intent test and determined that an intended 
mother was a legal parent when she had no genetic 
relationship with the child but had intended to bring the child 
into the world and raise the child.75 More recently, the intent 
test has been applied in a series of cases in Connecticut to 
recognize legal parentage of the intended parent(s) in both 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples that used gestational 
surrogacy, even if the intended parent(s) had no genetic 
relationship to the child.76  
Of the cases surveyed, 20.67% used the intent test as the 
basis of the judicial decision.77 
                                            
 72. Id. at 781−82. 
 73. Id. at 782. 
 74. Id. 
 75. McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480−81 (App. Div. 1994). 
 76. See Goad v. Arel, No. FA074025574, 2007 WL 4711515, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
May 24, 2007); Wray v. Samuel, No. FA074024921, 2007 WL 4711519, at *1 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Apr. 20, 2007); Caliendo v. Mariano, No. FA074023465S, 2007 WL 4711520, at *1 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2007); Caird v. Lugo, No. FA064017776, 2006 WL 5242383, at *1 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2006); DiComo v. Hopkins, No. FA054007885S, 2005 WL 
6007836, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2005); Velardo v. Murray, No. 485648, 2004 WL 
5506691, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2004); Friend v. Lugo, No. CV020467901, 2002 
WL 34370247, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2002); Hatzopoulos v. Murray, No. 
FA020460329S, 2002 WL 34370245, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2002); Vogle v. 
Kirkbride, No. FA 02-0471850, 2002 WL 34119315, *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002). 
Compare Griffiths v. Taylor, No. FA084015629, 2008 WL 2745130, at *1, *3, *5 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. June 13, 2008) (using a statutory approach, the court came to the same 
conclusion had the intent test been used, finding the two intended fathers that used a 
gestational surrogate were legal parents of that child), with Oleski v. Hynes, No. 
KNLFA084008415, 2008 WL 2930518, at *3, *5, *8, *11, *1819 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 
10, 2008) (using a statutory approach, the court came to a different result than had the 
intent test been used, finding that only the intended father with a genetic relationship 
was the legal father of the children born via a gestational surrogate, and that the other 
intended father was not entitled under Connecticut law to be named as the childrens 
parent on their birth certificates). 
 77. See infra Table 1. 
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Using the Chi-squared test, the coded factors for each case 
were analyzed. Three of the coded factors proved to be 
statistically significant: (1) the type of ART used; (2) the 
relationship status of the parties using ART; and (3) the 
jurisdictional location of the court.78 Each of the factors was 
analyzed in relation to the approach used by the court to 
determine parentage. The results of this statistical analysis 
are below. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about the bases for 
judicial decisions in cases that analyzed parentage of ART 
children. Results are examined both before and after 1993, the 
year in which the California Supreme Court decided Johnson 
v. Calvert,79 the landmark intent test case mentioned supra.80 
With N representing the number of cases in our sample that 
fall under the specified condition, of the 208 cases in the study, 
in 108 cases (51.92%) the judge relied on a statute to make her 
decision, 17 (8.17%) were based on public policy, 33 (15.87%) 
were decided based on BIOC, 7 (3.37%) were decided based on 
genetics, and 43 (20.67%) were based on intent. 
Table 1. Basis for Judicial Decision, Pre- and Post-1993 
 Entire Sample 
(N = 208) 
Pre-1993 
(N = 36) 
Post-1993 
(N=172) 
Basis for Judicial Decision    
Statute 
N = 108 
(51.92%) 
N = 22 
(61.11%) 
N = 86 
(50.00%) 
Public Policy 
N = 17 
(8.17%) 
N = 4 
(11.11%) 
N = 13 
(7.56%) 
BIOC 
N = 33 
(15.87%) 
N = 7 
(19.44%) 
N = 26 
(15.12%) 
Genetics 
N = 7 
(3.37%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 7 
(4.07%) 
Intent 
N = 43 
(20.67%) 
N = 3 
(8.33%) 
N = 40 
(23.26%) 
Source: Authors data and calculations. 
N is the number of cases in our sample that fall under the specified condition. 
 
                                            
 78. See infra Table 2. 
 79. Johnson, 851 P.2d  at 776. 
 80. See supra text accompanying notes 7074. 
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Table 2 explores factors that had a statistically significant 
impact on judicial decisions in ART cases, including the type of 
ART used, the relationship status of the parties using ART, 
and the jurisdictional location of the court (identified by 
circuit). 
The majority of the 208 cases examined involved 
alternative insemination (60.10%). Ninety-four (45.19%) of the 
cases involved lesbian couples. The cases occurred in all twelve 
circuits, with the most cases (fifty-six) occurring in the Second 
Circuit. The cases were coded by state, but the sample sizes by 
state were too small to analyze statistically. The state cases 
were grouped by circuit for the Chi-squared tests. 
Table 2. Factors Potentially Influencing Judicial 
Decisions, Pre- and Post-1993 
 
Entire Sample 
(N = 208) 
Pre-1993 
(N = 36) 
Post-1993 
(N=172) 
Type of ART    
Alternative Insemination 
N = 125 
(60.10%) 
N = 27 
(75.00%) 
N = 98 
(56.98%) 
In Vitro Fertilization 
N = 23 
(11.54%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 23 
(13.95%) 
Gestational Surrogacy 
N = 46 
(21.74%) 
N = 2 
(5.56%) 
N = 44 
(25.15%) 
Traditional Surrogacy 
N = 14 
(6.73%) 
N = 7 
(19.4%) 
N = 7 
(4.30%) 
Relationship Status    
Married Heterosexual 
Couples 
N = 76 
(36.54%) 
N = 25 
(69.44%) 




N = 13 
(6.25%) 
N = 1 
(2.78%) 
N = 12 
(6.98%) 
Lesbian Couples 
N = 94 
(45.19%) 
N = 8 
(22.20%) 
N = 86 
(50.00%) 
Gay Male Couples 
N = 10 
(4.81%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 10 
(5.81%) 
Single Female 
N = 12 
(5.77%) 
N = 2 
(5.56%) 
N = 10 
(5.81%) 
Single Male 
N = 3 
(1.44%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 3 
(1.44%) 
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Circuit Court     
First81 
N = 14 
(6.73%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 14 
(8.14%) 
Second82 
N = 56 
(27.92%) 
N = 14 
(38.89%) 
N = 42 
(24.42%) 
Third83 
N = 23 
(11.06%) 
N = 3 
(8.33%) 
N = 20 
(11.63%) 
Fourth84 
N = 12 
(5.77%) 
N = 3 
(8.33%) 
N = 9 
(5.23%) 
Fifth85 
N = 11 
(5.29%) 
N = 1 
(2.78%) 
N = 10 
(5.81%) 
Sixth86 
N = 23 
(11.06%) 
N = 3 
(8.33%) 
N = 20 
(11.63%) 
Seventh87 
N = 13 
(6.25%) 
N = 2 
(5.56%) 
N = 11 
(6.40%) 
Eighth88 
N = 6 
(2.88%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 6 
(3.49%) 
Ninth89 
N = 33 
(15.87%) 
N = 6 
(16.67%) 
N = 27 
(15.70%) 
Tenth90 
N = 10 
(4.81%) 
N = 3 
(8.33%) 
N = 7 
(4.07%) 
Eleventh91 
N = 6 
(2.88%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 6 
(3.49%) 
District of Columbia92 
N = 1 
(0.48%) 
N = 1 
(2.78%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
Source: Authors data and calculations. 
Table 3 provides descriptive information on the type of 
ART compared to the relationship status of the persons using 
                                            
 81. The First Circuit includes the following states (with the number of cases in each 
state in parentheses): Maine (three), Massachusetts (eleven), New Hampshire (zero), 
Puerto Rico (zero), and Rhode Island (one). 
 82. The Second Circuit includes the following states: Connecticut (twenty-four), 
New York (thirty-five), and Vermont (two). 
 83. The Third Circuit includes the following states and territory: Delaware (two), 
New Jersey (twelve), Pennsylvania (eleven), and the Virgin Islands (zero). 
 84. The Fourth Circuit includes the following states: Maryland (two), North 
Carolina (five), South Carolina (one), Virginia (four), and West Virginia (zero). 
 85. The Fifth Circuit includes the following states: District of the Canal Zone (zero), 
Louisiana (two), Mississippi (zero), and Texas (nine). 
 86. The Sixth Circuit includes the following states: Kentucky (three), Michigan 
(one), Ohio (eighteen), and Tennessee (two). 
 87. The Seventh Circuit includes the following states: Illinois (six), Indiana (five), 
and Wisconsin (two). 
 88. The Eighth Circuit includes the following states: Arkansas (two), Iowa (zero), 
Minnesota (three), Missouri (one), Nebraska (one), North Dakota (zero), and South 
Dakota (zero). 
 89. The Ninth Circuit includes the following states and territory: Alaska (zero), 
Arizona (three), California (twenty-four), Guam (zero), Hawaii (zero), Idaho (zero), 
Montana (zero), Nevada (zero), Oregon (four), and Washington (three). 
 90. The Tenth Circuit includes the following states: Colorado (three), Kansas (two), 
New Mexico (three), Oklahoma (zero), Utah (two), and Wyoming (zero). 
 91. The Eleventh Circuit includes the following states: Alabama (one), Florida (six), 
and Georgia (one). 
 92. The District of Columbia Circuit includes the District of Columbia (one). 
Do Not Delete  4/28/2013  10:03 AM 
1312 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [50:5 
ART. In the 208 ART cases published on Westlaw, married 
heterosexual couples relied primarily on gestational surrogacy 
(40.79%), unmarried heterosexual couples relied mostly on 
alternative insemination (53.85%), lesbian couples relied 
primarily on alternative insemination (88.30%), and single 
females relied mostly on alternative insemination (75.00%). 
Understandably, both gay male couples and single males relied 
exclusively on surrogacy (100.00%). 
Chi-squared tests for significance were added to the rows 
and columns of Table 3. Significance is denoted by an asterisk 
(*) in the cell. Reading from left to right, looking at the 
Significance Test column, the Chi-squared test establishes if, 
for example, in the 208 cases examined, married heterosexual 
couples are equally likely to use alternative insemination, IVF, 
gestational surrogacy, or traditional surrogacy, or if there is a 
significant relationship between relationship status and the 
type of ART used. The Chi-squared value for the first row is 
significant, indicating that in court cases involving married 
heterosexual couples, the type of ART is not random. These 
couples are most likely to use gestational surrogacy and 
alternative insemination. Also in the 208 cases examined, the 
type of ART used by lesbian couples and gay male couples is 
statistically significant. 
Reading from top to bottom, the significance tests in the 
bottom row provide information on the likelihood that, for 
example, in the 208 court cases determining parentage, using 
alternative insemination is equally likely across all 
relationship statuses. The Chi-squared test in the first column 
is significant, indicating that there is a significant relationship 
between alternative insemination and relationship status. 
Alternative insemination is most likely to be used by lesbian 
couples and married heterosexual couples. Columns three and 
four are also significant, indicating that gestational and 
traditional surrogacy does not occur randomly across 
relationship statuses. 
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Table 3. Type of Assisted Reproductive Technology Used 
by Each Relationship Status 
 Type of ART 
 
AI 
(N = 125) 
IVF 
(N = 23) 
GS 
(N = 46) 
TS 









N = 26 
(34.21%) 
N = 6 
(7.89%) 
N = 31 
(40.79%) 
N = 13 
(17.11%) N = 76 
X2 = 54.19 




N = 7 
(53.85%) 
N = 4 
(30.77%) 
N = 2 
(15.38%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) N = 13 
X2 = 5.78 
Pr = 0.13 
Lesbian 
Couples 
N = 83 
(88.30%) 
N = 11 
(11.70%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) N = 94 
X2 = 71.35 
Pr = 0.00* 
Gay Male 
Couples 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 9 
(90.00%) 
N = 1 
(10.00%) N = 10 
X2 = 23.04 
Pr = 0.00* 
Single Female 
N = 9 
(75.00%) 
N = 2 
(16.67%) 
N = 1 
(8.33%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) N = 12 
X2 = 2.66 
Pr = 0.45 
Single Male 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 3 
(100.0%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) N = 3 
X2 = 11.03 
Pr = 0.01 
Significance 
Test 
X2 = 73.31 
Pr = 0.00* 
X2 = 6.42 
Pr = 0.27 
X2 = 74.37 
Pr = 0.00* 
X2 = 22.00 
Pr = 0.00*   
Source: Authors data and calculations.  
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level or below. 
 Type of ART: 
AI = Alternative Insemination 
IVF = In Vitro Fertilization 
GS = Gestational Surrogacy 
TS = Traditional Surrogacy 
 
Table 4 provides descriptive information on the basis of the 
judges decision compared to the type of ART used. Regardless of 
the type of ART used, judges relied primarily on statutes and intent 
in making their parentage decisions. In the 208 cases examined, 
judges in alternative insemination cases relied on statutes in 
59.20% of the cases and intent in 12.80% of the cases. In IVF cases, 
judges relied on statutes in 45.83% of the cases and intent in 
29.17% of the cases. In gestational surrogacy cases, judges relied on 
statutes and intent nearly equally, using statute in nearly 40% of 
the cases and intent in nearly 45% of the cases. In traditional 
surrogacy cases, judges relied on statutes in 50.00% of the cases and 
intent in none of the cases. 
Chi-squared tests for significance were added to the rows and 
columns of Table 4. The results presented in the last column of 
Table 4 show that in the 208 cases examined, there is a statistically 
significant relationship between alternative insemination and the 
basis on which the judge made her decision. The same can be said of 
gestational surrogacy. There is not, however, a significant 
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relationship between IVF or traditional surrogacy and the basis of 
the judges decision. In cases involving alternative insemination, 
judges are more likely to rely on statutes and BIOC when making 
parentage decisions than on genetics, intent, or public policy. 
The results in the last row of Table 4 indicate that in the 208 
cases examined, statute, BIOC, genetics, and intent are all bases for 
judicial decisions that are not independent of the type of ART 
involved. That is, there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the approach used by the judge and the type of ART 
involved in the case. In the relatively small number of cases that 
used public policy to determine parentage, however, the data does 
not show any significant relationship between that approach and 
the type of ART used. 
Table 4. Effect of Reproductive Technology on  
Judicial Decision 
 Basis of Judicial Decision 
 
Statute 
(N = 108) 
Public 
Policy 
(N = 17) 
BIOC 
(N = 33) 
Genetics 
(N = 7) 
Intent 
(N = 43) Total Sig. Test 
Type of 
ART        
AI 
N = 74 
(59.20%) 
N = 10 
(8.00%) 
N = 24 
(19.20%) 
N = 1 
(0.80%) 
N = 16 
(12.80%) N = 125 
X2 = 20.92 
Pr = 0.00* 
IVF 
N = 10 
(45.83%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 6 
(25.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 7 
(29.17%) N = 23 
X2 = 5.70 
Pr = 0.22 
GS 
N = 17 
(38.56%) 
N = 4 
(8.89%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 5 
(11.11%) 
N = 20 
(44.44%) N = 46 
X2 = 37.76 
Pr = 0.00* 
TS 
N = 7 
(50.00%) 
N = 3 
(21.43%) 
N = 3 
(21.43%) 
N = 1 
(7.14%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) N = 14 
X2 = 7.27 
Pr = 0.12 
Sig. 
Test 
X2 = 7.86 
Pr = 0.05* 
X2 = 5.45 
Pr = 0.14 
X2 = 11.35 
Pr = 0.01* 
X2 = 12.28 
Pr = 0.01* 
X2 = 24.94 
Pr = 0.00*   
Source: Authors data and calculations. 
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level. 
 Types of ART: 
AI = Alternative Insemination 
IVF = In Vitro Fertilization 
GS = Gestational Surrogacy 
TS = Traditional Surrogacy 
 
 Table 5 reports results from an analysis of whether the 
relationship status factor influenced judicial decisions. Similar 
to the data presented in Table 4, regardless of the relationship 
status of the intended parents, judges most often relied on 
statutes in making their parentage decisions.  
Here we performed similar Chi-squared tests to examine 
the relationship between the basis of judicial decisions and the 
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relationship status of the persons using ART. The results are 
presented in the last column and the last row in Table 5. The 
relationship status matters significantly when it comes to 
what test the judge used to determine parentage. Looking at 
the last column, the Chi-squared tests show that judges are 
not equally likely to apply all five tests with married 
heterosexual couples, lesbian couples, and single males. On the 
other hand, for unmarried heterosexual couples, gay couples, 
and single persons, there was no significant relationship 
between relationship status and the test used. Looking at the 
bottom row, the Chi-squared tests in the public policy, BIOC, 
and genetics columns show that judges are not equally likely 
to apply their decisions across all couple types. 
Table 5. Effect of Relationship Status on Basis of  
Judicial Decision  
 Basis of Judicial Decision 
 
Statute 
(N = 108) 
Public 
Policy  
(N = 17) 
BIOC  
(N = 33) 
Genetics  
(N = 7) 
Intent  








N = 35 
(46.05%) 
N = 6 
(7.89%) 
N = 6 
(7.89%) 
N = 7 
(9.21%) 
N = 22 
(28.95%) N = 76 
X2 = 21.73 




N = 9 
(69.23%) 
N = 1 
(7.69%) 
N = 1  
(7.69%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 2 
(15.38%) N = 13 
X2 = 2.04 
Pr = 0.73 
Lesbian 
Couples 
N = 46 
(48.94%) 
N = 8 
(8.51%) 
N = 26  
(27.66%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 14  
(14.89%) N = 94 
X2 = 23.90 
Pr = 0.00* 
Gay Male 
Couples 
N = 8 
(80.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 2 
(20.00%) N = 10 
X2 = 4.48 
Pr = 0.35 
Single Female 
N = 9  
(75.00%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 3  
(25.00%) N = 12 
X2 = 4.91 
Pr = 0.30 
Single Male 
N = 1  
(33.33%) 
N = 2  
(66.67%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) N = 3 
X2 = 14.16 
Pr = 0.00* 
Significance 
Test 
X2 = 9.08 
Pr = 0.11 
X2 = 15.66 
Pr = 0.01* 
X2 = 18.78 
Pr = 0.00* 
X2 = 12.58 
Pr = 0.03* 
X2 = 6.23 
Pr = 0.28   
Source: Authors data and calculations.  
Note: * indicates significance at the .05 level. 
 
Table 6 provides the results from Chi-squared tests that 
examined the relationship between the jurisdictional location of 
the court and the basis of the judges decision. The data reveals 
that jurisdictional location is not consistently related to the test 
used. Of the 208 cases examined, only courts located in the First, 
Third, and Fifth Circuits showed a statistically significant 
relationship to the basis of the judges decision. All of the other 
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circuits are nearly significant in terms of the basis of the judicial 
decision. 
Table 6. Effect of Location of Court on Basis of  
Judicial Decision 
 Basis of Judges Decision 
 
Statute 
(N = 108) 
Public  
Policy 
(N = 17) 
BIOC 
(N = 33) 
Genetics 
(N = 7) 
Intent 
(N = 43) Total 
Significance 
Test 
Circuit Court        
First 
N = 2 
(14.29%) 
N = 2 
(14.29%) 
N = 6 
(42.86%) 
N = 1 
(7.14%) 
N = 3 
(21.43%) N = 14 
X2 = 12.32 
Pr = 0.01* 
Second 
N = 27 
(48.21%) 
N = 4 
(7.14%) 
N = 7 
(12.50%) 
N = 2 
(3.57%) 
N = 16 
(28.57%) N = 56 
X2 = 3.17 
Pr = 0.53 
Third 
N = 5 
(21.74%) 
N = 4 
(17.39%) 
N = 7 
(30.43%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 7 
(30.43%) N = 23 
X2 = 12.75 
Pr = 0.01* 
Fourth 
N = 5 
(41.67%) 
N = 1 
(8.33%) 
N = 1 
(8.33%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 5 
(41.67%) N = 12 
X2 = 3.86 
Pr = 0.43 
Fifth 
N = 11 
(100.0%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) N = 11 
X2 = 10.75 
Pr = 0.03* 
Sixth 
N = 12 
(52.17%) 
N = 3  
(13.04%) 
N = 4 
(17.39%) 
N = 1 
(4.35%) 
N = 3 
(13.04%) N = 23 
X2 = 1.59 
Pr = 0.81 
Seventh 
N = 8 
(61.54%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 2 
(15.38%) 
N = 1 
(7.69%) 
N = 2 
(15.38%) N = 13 
X2 = 2.34 
Pr = 0.67 
Eight 
N = 3 
(50.00%) 
N = 1 
(16.67%) 
N = 1 
(16.67%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 1 
(16.67%) N = 6 
X2 = 0.81 
Pr = 0.93 
Ninth 
N = 24 
(72.73%) 
N = 1 
(3.03%) 
N = 3 
(9.09%) 
N = 1 
(3.03%) 
N = 4 
(12.12%) N = 33 
X2 = 7.07 
Pr = 0.13 
Tenth 
N = 6 
(60.00%) 
N = 1  
(10.00%) 
N = 1 
(10.00%) 
N = 1 
(10.0%) 
N = 1 
(10.0%) N = 10 
X2 = 2.36 
Pr = 0.67 
Eleventh 
N = 5 
(83.33%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 1 
(16.67%) N = 6 
X2 = 2.92 
Pr = 0.57 
District of 
Columbia  
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 1 
(100%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) N = 1 
X2 = 5.33 
Pr = 0.26 
Source: Authors data and calculations. 
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level. 
 
The next five tables look specifically at the results of each case 
to determine the likelihood of the intended parents being declared 
the legal parents in any given case. As such, the remaining tables 
reflect a data set of 165 cases. This set of 165 cases includes all of 
the cases from the original 208 cases, less the 43 cases in which the 
court explicitly applied the intent test. 
When coding the cases, we included a factor that indicates 
whether the outcome of the case is the same as if the judge had 
relied on the intent test in making her decision. This factor is also 
referred to as results same. Table 7a reports the results from the 
analysis of the results same factor. Of the 165 cases decided on a 
basis other than intent, 106 had the same result. This indicates 
thatregardless of the stated test usedin 64.24% of cases decided 
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on a basis other than intent, the outcome nonetheless favored the 
intended parent(s). This is in addition to the 43 cases in which the 
intent test was applied. As a result, in 71.63% of the 208 cases in 
this study, the outcome of the case favored the intended parent(s). 
Table 7a also reports results from a Chi-squared test that 
examined the relationship between the basis of the judicial decision 
and results same. Here the data shows no statistically significant 
relationship between the basis of the decision and whether the 
outcome of the case was the same as if the intent test had been 
used. This lack of statistical significance is, in fact, significant. This 
shows that judges are not biased toward the outcome being in favor 
or against the intended parents in any given type of case. 
Table 7a. Judicial Decision Result Is the Same as the 
Intent Test  
 
Judicial Decision Result Is the 
Same as the Intent Test 
Basis of Judicial Decision  Percent 
Statute 
(N= 108) N = 65 60.19% 
Public Policy 
(N = 17) N = 10 58.82% 
BIOC 
(N = 33) N = 26 78.79% 
Genetics 
(N = 7) N = 5 71.43% 
Total 
(N = 165) N = 106 64.24% 
Significance Test  
X2 = 4.19 
Pr = 0.24 
Source: Authors data and calculations. 
 
 
Table 7b represents the same analysis as in Table 7a, with 
traditional surrogacy cases removed from the data set. Traditional 
surrogacy is not only extremely rare, but many argue that there are 
perhaps valid reasons why the intent test should not apply to 
traditional surrogacy in the same way as other types of ART.93 Table 
7b removes the variable of traditional surrogacy and recalculates 
the results same outcome compared to the basis of the judicial 
decision. Table 7b shows thatregardless of the stated test used
                                            
 93. See Brittnay M. McMahon, The Science Behind Surrogacy: Why New York 
Should Rethink Its Surrogacy Contracts Laws, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 359, 373 (2011); 
see also supra Table 2 (illustrating that traditional surrogacy accounts for only 6.73% of 
all ART procedures examined in the study). 
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in over 66% of cases decided on a basis other than intent and not 
including traditional surrogacy, the intended parents were 
nonetheless determined to be the legal parents. This is in addition 
to the 43 cases that applied the intent test. As a result, in 74.23% of 
the cases in this study, excluding the traditional surrogacy cases, 
the outcome of the case favored the intended parent(s). 
Also, like in Table 7a, the Chi-squared test shows no 
statistically significant relationship between the approach used by 
the judge and whether the outcome favored the intended parents. In 
other words, judges were equally comfortable with an outcome 
favoring the intended parents regardless of the approach used. 
Table 7b. Judicial Decision Result Is the Same as the 
Intent Test Not Including Traditional Surrogacy 
 
Judicial Decision Result Is the 
Same as the Intent Test 
Basis of Judicial Decision  Percent 
Statute 
(N=101) N = 64 63.37% 
Public Policy 
(N = 14) N = 9 64.29% 
BIOC 
(N = 30) N = 23 76.67% 
Genetics 
(N = 6) N = 5 83.33% 
Total 
(N = 151) N = 101 66.89% 
Significance Test  
X2 = 4.21 
Pr = 0.24 
Source: Authors data and calculations. 
 
Table 8 reports four key pieces of information. First, it shows 
how many cases came out the same as intent, considering both the 
type of ART and the judicial test used. For example, in alternative 
insemination cases in which the judge used a statute to decide the 
case, forty-four (59.46%) cases came out the same as had the intent 
test been used.94 Second, Table 8 reports the total number of cases 
that came out the same as if the intent test had been used per type 
of ART. For example, looking at the Total column, seventy (64.22%) 
alternative insemination cases came out the same as had the intent 
test been used.95 Third, Table 8 reports results from a Chi-squared 
                                            
 94. AIStatuteResults Same Cases from Table 8 (44) / AIStatute Cases from 
Table 4 (74) = 59.46%. 
 95. AIResults Same Cases from Table 8 (70) / (Total AI Cases (125)  AIIntent 
Cases (16) from Table 4) = 64.22%. 
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test that examined the relationship between the results same 
outcome and the type of ART used. Looking at the Significance Test 
column, we can reject the null hypothesis with regards to 
alternative insemination, gestational surrogacy, and traditional 
surrogacy and confidently say that results same is related to the 
type of ART used. Fourth, Table 8 reports results from a Chi-
squared test that examined the relationship between results same 
and basis of judicial decision. Looking at the Significance Test row, 
we can reject the null hypothesis with regards to statute and 
genetics and confidently say that these two bases of judicial 
decisions are significantly related to whether the outcome of the 
case will be that same as the intent test. 
Table 8. Judicial Decision Result Is the Same as the Intent 
Test by Type of ART and Basis of Judicial Decision 
 Basis of Judicial Decision Is the Same as the Intent Test 
 Statute 
Public 





      
AI 
N = 44 
(59.46%) 
N = 6 
(60.00%) 
N = 19 
(79.17%) 
N = 1 
(100.00%) 
N = 70 
(64.22%) 
2 = 5.85 
Pr = 0.12* 
IVF 
N = 7 
(70.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 4 
(66.67%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 11 
(68.75%) 
2 = 3.30 
Pr = 0.34 
GS 
N = 13 
(76.47%) 
N = 3 
(75.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 4 
(80.00%) 
N = 20 
(76.92%) 
2 = 18.36 
Pr = 0.00* 
TS 
N = 1 
(14.29%) 
N = 1 
(33.00%) 
N = 3  
(100.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 5 
(35.71%) 
2 = 6.44 
Pr = 0.09* 
Total 
N = 65 
(60.19%) 
N = 10 
(58.82%) 
N = 26 
(78.79%) 
N = 5 
(71.43%) 




X2 = 7.34 
Pr = 0.06* 
X2 = 2.73 
Pr = 0.44 
X2 = 6.02 
Pr = 0.11 
X2 = 116.39 
Pr = 0.00*   
Source: Authors data and calculations.  
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  
Note: this table excludes cases in which the judge applied the intent test. 
 Types of ART: 
AI = Alternative Insemination 
IVF = In Vitro Fertilization 
GS = Gestational Surrogacy 
TS = Traditional Surrogacy 
 
Table 9 also reports four key pieces of information. First, 
it shows how many cases came out the same as intent, 
considering both relationship status and judicial test used. For 
example, in cases with married heterosexual couples in which 
the judge used a statute to decide the case, twenty-five 
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(71.43%) cases came out the same as had the intent test been 
used.96 Second, Table 9 reports the total number of cases that 
came out the same as if the intent test had been used per 
relationship status. For example, looking at the total column, 
forty (74.07%) cases involving married heterosexual couples 
came out the same as had the intent test been used.97 Third, 
Table 9 reports results from a Chi-squared test that examined 
the relationship between results same and relationship status. 
Looking at the Significance Test column, we can reject the null 
hypothesis with regards to married heterosexual couples, 
lesbian couples, and single males and confidently say that 
relationship status is significantly related to judicial decisions 
that had the same outcome as the intent test. Cases involving 
married heterosexual couples, lesbian couples, and single 
males are most likely to result in a parentage determination 
that is the same as had the judge relied on the intent test. 
Fourth, Table 9 reports results from a Chi-squared test that 
examined the relationship between results same and basis of 
judicial decision. Looking at the Significance Test row, we can 
reject the null hypothesis with regards to statute, public 
policy, BIOC, and genetics and confidently say that all four 
bases of the judicial decision are significantly related to 
whether the outcome will be the same as the intent test. 
                                            
 96. MHCStatuteResults Same Cases from Table 9 (25) / MHCStatute Cases 
from Table 5 (35) = 71.43%. 
 97. MHCResults Same Cases from Table 9 (40) / (Total MHC Cases (76)  MHC
Intent Cases (22) from Table 5) = 74.07%. 
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Table 9. Judicial Decision Result Is the Same as the  
Intent Test by Relationship Status and Basis of  
Judicial Decision 












N = 25 
(71.43%) 
N = 4 
(66.67%) 
N = 6 
(100%) 
N = 5 
(71.43%) 
N = 40 
(74.07%) 
2 = 9.22 




N = 7 
(77.78%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 7 
(63.64%) 
2 = 3.86 
Pr = 0.28 
Lesbian 
Couples  
N = 18  
(39.13%) 
N = 4  
(50.00%) 
N = 20 
(76.92%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 42  
(52.50%) 
2 = 28.31 
Pr = 0.00* 
Gay Male 
Couples 
N = 6 
(75.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 6 
(75.00%) 
2 = 3.27 
Pr = 0.35 
Single Female 
N = 8 
(88.89%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 8  
(88.89%) 
2 = 5.46 
Pr =0.14 
Single Male  
N = 1  
(100.00%) 
N = 2  
(100%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 3 
(100.00%) 
2 = 12.02 
Pr = 0.00* 
Total 
N = 65 
(60.19%) 
N = 10 
(58.82%) 
N = 26 
(78.79%) 
N = 5 
(71.43%) 
N = 106 
(64.24%)  
Significance Test 
2 = 26.88 
Pr =0.00* 
2 = 21.49 
Pr = 0.00* 
2 = 11.83 
Pr = 0.04* 
2 = 15.60 
Pr = 0.06*   
Source: Authors data and calculations. 
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  
Note: this table excludes cases in which the judge applied the intent test. 
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Table 10 also reports four key pieces of information. First, 
it shows how many cases came out the same as intent, 
considering both jurisdictional location (by circuit court) and 
judicial test used. For example, in Second Circuit cases in 
which the judge used a statute to decide the case, sixteen 
(59.26%) cases came out the same as had the intent test been 
used98 Table 10 also reports the total number of results same 
cases per circuit. For example, looking at the Total column, 
twenty-seven (67.50%) Second Circuit cases came out the same 
as had the intent test been used.99 Third, Table 10 reports 
results from a Chi-squared test that examined the relationship 
between the results same and the circuit court in which the 
case was heard. The Chi-squared test, here, looks at the 
chance that particular courts were just as likely to make a 
results same decision equally across all bases of decision. It 
was found that in all but the First and Third Circuits, judicial 
test is not significant, meaning that decisions that relied on 
statute, public policy, BIOC, or genetics were all equally likely 
to have a result that mirrored the result that would have 
occurred had they used intent. Fourth, Table 10 reports results 
from a Chi-squared test that examined the relationship 
between results same of all circuits and the basis of the 
judicial decision. Looking at the Significance Test row, we can 
reject the null hypothesis with regards to statute and BIOC 
and confidently say that these two bases of judicial decisions 
are significantly related to whether the outcome of the case 
will be the same as the intent test. 
                                            
 98. Second CircuitStatuteResults Same Cases from Table 10 (16) / Second 
CircuitStatute Cases from Table 6 (27) = 59.26%. 
 99. Second CircuitResults Same Cases from Table 10 (27) / (Total Second Circuit 
Cases (56)  Second CircuitIntent Cases (16) from Table 6 = 67.50%. 
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Table 10. Judicial Decision Result Is the Same as the 
Intent Test by Location of Court and Basis of  
Judicial Decision 















N = 1 
(50.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 5 
(83.33%) 
N = 1 
(100%) 
N = 7 
(63.64%) 
X2 = 15.08 
Pr = 0.00* 
Second 
N = 16 
(59.26%) 
N = 4  
(100%) 
N = 6 
(85.71%) 
N = 1 
(50.00%) 
N = 27 
(67.50%) 
X2 = 0.93 
Pr = 0.82 
Third 
N = 3 
(60.00%) 
N = 2 
(50.00%) 
N = 6 
(85.71%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 11 
(68.75%) 
X2 = 10.97 
Pr = 0.01* 
Fourth 
N = 4 
(80.00%) 
N = 1 
(100%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 5 
(71.43%) 
X2 = 1.89 
Pr = 0.60 
Fifth 
N = 7 
(63.64%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 7 
(63.64%) 
X2 = 3.86 
Pr = 0.28 
Sixth 
N = 6 
(50.00%) 
N = 1 
(33.33%) 
N = 3 
(75.00%) 
N = 1 
(100%) 
N = 11 
(55.00%) 
X2 = 1.20 
Pr = 0.75 
Seventh 
N = 5 
(62.50%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 1 
(100%) 
N = 6 
(54.55%) 
X2 = 4.46 
Pr = 0.22 
Eighth 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 1 
(100%) 
N = 1 
(100%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 2 
(40.00%) 
X2 = 5.42 
Pr = 0.14 
Ninth 
N = 16 
(66.67%) 
N = 1 
(100%) 
N = 3 
(100%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 20 
(68.97%) 
X2 = 2.61 
Pr = 0.46 
Tenth 
N = 4 
(66.67%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 1  
(100%) 
N = 1  
(100%) 
N = 6 
(66.67%) 
X2 = 2.94 
Pr = 0.40 
Eleventh 
N = 3  
(60.00%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 0  
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 3 
(60.00%) 
X2 = 1.62 
Pr = 0.66 
D.C. 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 1 
(100.00%) 
N = 0 
(0.00%) 
N = 1 
(100.00%) 
X2 = 4.02 
Pr = 0.26 
Total 
N = 65 
(60.19%) 
N = 10 
(58.82%) 
N = 26 
(78.79%) 
N = 5 
(71.43%) 




2 =  19.54 
Pr = 0.05* 
2 = 828 
Pr = 0.69 
2 = 25.59 
Pr = 0.00* 
2 = 7.36 
Pr = 0.77   
Source: Authors data and calculations.  
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  
Note: this table excludes cases in which the judge applied the intent test. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The results of this study confirm that when addressing legal 
parentage of ART children, judges have struggled with how best 
to make that determination. This is due, in large part, to the lack 
of clear and applicable statutes concerning parentage when a 
child is conceived via ART. Faced with legislative silence, courts 
have developed various approaches for determining legal 
parentage, leading to unpredictable and sometimes inequitable 
results. 
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For over twenty years, legal scholars and judges have argued 
about the efficacy of the intent test in determining parentage in 
ART cases. This is the first time a study has been conducted to 
determine how judges are actually deciding ART cases. In over 
20% of the cases, judges are applying the intent test.100 In 
addition, of the remaining cases, regardless of the stated basis on 
which the judge made her decisionstatute, public policy, BIOC, 
or geneticsin seven out of ten cases the outcome is the same as 
if the judge had used the intent test.101 These results confirm that 
the intent test is a common sense approach to determining 
parentage that courts have been using for the past twenty years. 
They also indicate that awarding legal parentage to the intended 
parents is not inconsistent with the overarching goals of 
determining legal parentage. Finally, these results signify that 
adopting intent statutes will, in the majority of circumstances, 
lead to outcomes that are aligned with how judges are currently 
determining parentage in ART cases. 
 
                                            
 100. See supra Table 1. 
 101. (Results Same Cases Excluding Traditional Surrogacy from Table 7b (101) + 
Total Intent Cases from Table 1 (43)) / (Total Cases from Table 1 (208)  Total Traditional 
Surrogacy Cases from Table 2 (14)) = 74.23%. 
